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The Tiananmen Protestors, Then and Now 
April 26, 2009 in A Year of Anniversaries by The China Beat | No comments 
China Beat sent out a note to a few scholars and journalists who have carefully watched and written 
about the events of 1989, asking them to send in short commentaries detailing what they wish more 
people knew, associated with, or remembered about that spring. We ran the first piece in this limited 
series, by John Gittings, last week. This is the second piece. 
Jonathan Unger is a Professor at Australia National University, the former editor of the China 
Journal, a co-author of Chen Village, and editor or co-editor of many books, including The Pro-
democracy Protests in China: Reports from the Provinces. 
By Jonathan Unger 
Looking back in time from a distance of two decades, we are apt to forget the economic circumstances 
in which the nationwide protests of 1989 arose, as well as the vantage points of the protests’ 
participants. 
In the late 1980s, people across China felt frustrated and angered by inflation and mounting 
corruption. This dissatisfaction had been moving toward a crisis point over the previous couple of 
years despite the fact that urban living standards, on the whole, had been rising steadily throughout 
most of the Eighties. But expectations of a better life had been rising even faster, and when inflation 
in 1988 began to overtake wage rises in the state sector, frustrations sharpened. Workers who had 
been willing to countenance the corruption of officials when their own wage packets were growing 
healthily became resentful in 1988 and 1999 when they saw that the close kin of officials were cutting 
themselves an undue share of the pie while their own slices shrank. 
What held the protesters together was the very fact that theirs was a protestmovement, without a 
clear platform. Had there been one, far fewer people might have participated – for the solutions to 
China’s economic ailments favored by different groups among the protesters were very much at 
variance. Some of the protesters who came into the streets – in particular the leading intellectuals and 
most of the students – wanted the economic reforms to proceed faster. Others among the protesters 
contrarily had discovered that the economic reforms had not been to their advantage: particularly 
those in the working class whose incomes were declining, and those whose jobs were no longer secure 
or who had already been laid off. Only a fragile unity was pasted together among these groups. The 
better educated had little sympathy for the circumstances of the laborers, and for much of the time 
the university students sought to keep the working class at arms’ length, preventing workers from 
entering the perimeters of their own demonstrations. 
All the same, more than merely anger at economic woes and corruption held the various protesters on 
the same side of the political divide. They did project a vague common vision of what they wanted, 
and it was summed up in the word “Democracy.” The word was blazoned on a multitude of their 
banners. But by “democracy,” few of the protesters meant one person, one vote. Most of the 
university students and intellectuals had no desire to see the nation’s leadership determined by the 
peasants, who comprised a majority of the population. Many urban residents held the rural populace 
in disdain, and their fear was that the peasants would be swayed by demagogues and vote-buying. 
Some of the protesters were nonetheless vaguely pro-democratic just so long as democracy could be 
put off to a future time. The then-Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang favored a policy called “neo-
authoritarianism,” under which the Party would act as a benevolent autocracy until such time as the 
middle class had developed sufficiently to predominate in a very gradually democratized polity. Until 
then, China would remain in a state of tutelage, much as Sun Yat-sen had proposed in the 1920s. This 
was the program of the Party’s reform camp, and it drew support from among the urban educated 
elite. 
If not immediate political democracy in the shape of multiparty elections for the nation’s leaders, what 
some of the educated protesters in Tiananmen Square wanted, rather, was an independent press that 
could play a watch-dog role over the political leadership. They wanted access to more interesting 
magazines and films. They also wanted what they considered a more fair distribution of incomes, in 
which they would be beneficiaries. They wanted academic freedom, and the ability to safely advise 
and constructively criticize the government. 
But their use of the word “Democracy” also represented more than that, and its mass appeal lay in 
this additional dimension. Above all, the great bulk of the participants in the protests wanted freedom 
from the petty constraints imposed upon them at their place of work or school. For decades, access to 
travel tickets, entertainment, accommodation, medical care – a vast range of advantages and 
sanctions large and small – had been controlled by work-unit bureaucrats, who dispensed favors to 
those who kept their noses clean or, worse yet, to those who obediently kowtowed to these Party 
hacks. People wanted out from under these stifling controls. 
Everywhere across China, they named their new student groups AutonomousStudent Associations (in 
China, literally Student Self-ruling [zizhi] Associations). So too, the organizations that the intellectuals 
established almost invariably were titled Autonomous associations. The workers’ groups were 
titled AutonomousWorkers’ Leagues. The key demand quickly became that the government recognize 
their organizations, and not exact retribution for having established them. What the urban populace of 
China was demanding, in short, was no less and no more than “civil society” – an intermediary sphere 
between state and society that is not controlled by the state and that creates a ‘space’ between the 
polity and the populace. In China, even innocuous independent organizations had not been allowed. 
For the previous forty years all “mass organizations” were creatures of the party-government. What 
the populace essentially demanded was simply an opportunity to relate to each other without 
interference or oversight. It was for this reason that this word Autonomous held importance to them. 
It was precisely these demands, harmless though they might appear, that seem to have frightened 
the old men of Zhongnanhai, China’s Kremlin. It is likely that the crisis could have been brought 
peacefully to a close had they formally recognized the new organizations’ right to exist. But from 
beginning to end, China’s leaders felt they needed steadfastly to refuse that recognition. Their whole 
conception of the reformed Leninist state was at stake. Earlier in the Eighties, they had already bent 
enough to allow advisory forums containing “leading personages” to be formed. But even if some 
semi-autonomous forums were to exist in the new China, they, the Party leaders, would initiate them. 
First the students and then quickly other social groups were taking that initiative out of the Party’s 
hands, were grabbing the nettle for themselves. It signaled to the aged Party leaders a dangerous 
political environment in which people not only were shaping their own operational sphere but, worse 
yet, might well wish to use that new-found ground in future to play an active role in the political 
arena. In fact, they were in the midst of doing so in Tiananmen Square. This went against everything 
that the Party leaders were accustomed to or believed in – which is that the Communist Party is 
uniquely positioned to steer China into a better future, without interference. They were not willing to 
see the Leninist polity, theirpolity, successfully challenged and weakened. 
Out in the Square, meanwhile, a new rights consciousness was quickly emerging, but it was still a 
crudely formed consciousness. As noted, the protesters who had joined one or another of the new 
jerry-built associations had been acting on an emotional feeling about what they were against – 
irritated by corruption and the difficulties in the economy and tired of the Party’s control over so many 
aspects of their lives. But very few of the activists and protest leaders held any real notion of what 
type of political structure might conceivably take the place of the strong-handed Party machine. Very 
few, even among the intellectuals, had any coherent political program to offer – just very vaguely 
worded demands for a liberalization and relaxation of the system. It was a movement of protest that 
was groping blindly in the dark. 
Then and Now 
If anything, many of the protesters at Tiananmen were more in favor of political liberalization than 
they are now. At the time, they admired Mikhail Gorbachev and the political reforms he was carrying 
out. But the collapse and dismemberment of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the corruption 
and plunging living standards that soon followed under Boris Yeltsin’s rule soured China’s educated on 
the idea of Party-led political liberalization along Gorbachev’s lines. By the mid-1990s, young Russian 
women were flowing into China to work as prostitutes. Chinese considered this shocking evidence of 
Russia’s penury and humiliation. Many of the urban educated who had demonstrated in 1989 began to 
feel relieved that China had followed Deng Xiaoping’s policy of economic rather than political reform. 
Nevertheless, many of them today still think of themselves as pro-reform, albeit in modest ways. They 
are apt to shake their heads in dismay at China’s environmental problems and express hopes that the 
government will give greater priority to the issue. Those with expertise are often eager to offer up 
suggestions on how to enact this or that small, incremental reform. What pass in China for academic 
papers are often really policy prescriptions on how to improve one or another aspect of China’s 
physical or administrative infrastructure, or relieve traffic congestion, or provide for a more effective 
education curriculum. 
Generally, the urban educated today have what they wanted at the time of the Tiananmen protests. 
They feel they can make such recommendations and that their expertise is respected. They and their 
children also now have their personal space, in the shape of access to websites, chat rooms, and a 
wide variety of publications and films. They can say what they want so long as they stay within 
increasingly generous boundaries and do not challenge the Party’s political monopoly. 
Above all, in their material livelihoods the urban educated are doing very well, whereas at the time of 
the Tiananmen protests in 1989, they had good reason to be angry. Their salaries were low, and sour 
jokes circulated about private barbers earning more with their razors than hospital surgeons with their 
scalpels. But in the years since, there has been a deliberate government policy to favor the well-
educated. Year after year the professionals on government payrolls have been offered repeatedly 
higher salaries. During one year in the late 1990s, the pay of all of the academics at China’s most 
prestigious public universities was literally doubled in one go. Opportunities to earn high salaries 
opened up just as much in the private sector. Many of the university students at Tiananmen Square in 
1989 now drive cars and live in fancy high-rise apartments. They have gained a lifestyle that they had 
never imagined possible, and they do not want to upset the apple cart. If the government’s plan was 
to co-opt the salaried middle class, it has worked. 
Reflecting on the Tiananmen protests, one of the most famous of the student leaders, Wuer Kaixi, 
flippantly articulated their desires, “So what do we want? Nike shoes. Lots of free time to take our 
girlfriends to a bar. The freedom to discuss an issue with someone. And to get a little respect from 
society.” They now have all that, in spades. 
As a result, the members of the educated middle class, including many of the former university 
students who crowded Tiananmen Square two decades ago, have become a bulwark of the current 
regime. Summarizing a large survey of political attitudes in Beijing, a recent book concludes that, 
among all urban groups, “those who perceive themselves to belong to the middle class and who are 
government bureaucrats are more likely to support the incumbent authorities.” If there is another 
outbreak like Tiananmen, in fact, many of them might prefer to be on the government side of the 
barricades. 
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